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Public Fora, Neutral Governments, and
the Prism of Property
by
CALVIN MASSEY*
The public forum' problem-to what degree and in what manner
may governments regulate or forbid speech on public property?-has
never been satisfactorily resolved by the Court. The Court's public
forum doctrine has oscillated between two conflicting visions of the
free speech guarantee. One vision-the "affirmative" theory-sees
the First Amendment as obligating governments to act affirmatively
to promote increased public discourse. As much public property as
possible ought to be open for speech. The other vision-the
"negative" theory-sees the First Amendment as obligating
governments to remain scrupulously neutral in public discourse. So
long as public property is closed to speech in a fashion that does not
alter the content or outcome of public discourse the free speech
principle is not offended. To compound the difficulty of choosing
between these two visions, the Court has formulated its public forum
doctrine-which determines the amount of judicial scrutiny any
particular speech restriction on public property receives-almost
entirely by categorizing the property.
In the last twenty-five years the Court has created the public
forum doctrine, a labyrinth of conflicting rules for determining how
much deference ought to be accorded governmental decisions to limit
public access to public property for speech purposes. The aim of the
Court's project is to sort public property into two categories: the
public forum and the non-public forum. Restrictions of speech in the
public forum must be reasonable time, place, and manner regulations
that are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to advance "a significant
* Copyright Calvin Massey, 1999. Professor of Law, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law. I appreciate Vik Amar's comments on an earlier draft.
1. Harry Kalven is generally credited with coining the term. See Harry Kalven Jr.,
The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. Cr. REv. 1, 11-12 ("[lIn an
open, democratic society the streets, the parks, and other public places are. . . a public
forum that the citizen can commandeer; the generosity and empathy with which such
facilities are made available is an index of freedom.").
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government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for
communication."'2 Absolute bans on speech in a public forum must
be "narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental
interest."'3 By contrast, the non-public forum can be closed to speech
on the basis of the "subject matter and speaker identity so long as the
distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by
the forum and are viewpoint neutral."4 The Court further subdivides
the public forum into two subcategories-the unlimited public forum
and the limited public forum. The unlimited public forum consists of
public spaces that either (1) are so traditionally endowed with
unlimited public access that they are deemed open to all speakers, or
(2) have been deliberately dedicated by government to all speech
purposes. 5 The limited public forum consists of public property that
has been voluntarily opened to some, but not all, speakers.
6
Since characterization of public property is the fulcrum for
moving from minimal to intermediate scrutiny of governmental
speech restrictions the Court should pay especial care in crafting its
method for deciding this issue. There should be a high level of
confidence that the Court's taxonomy of public spaces is well-suited
to deliver results consonant with the foundational principles of the
free expression guarantee. Alas, there is little evidence in the United
States Reports of such a relationship. The Court's doctrine is crude,
historically ossified, and seemingly unconnected to any thematic view
of the free expression guarantee. We can do better.
It is quite possible that the Court started off with a fundamental
error-misconceiving the speech issues involved in the public forum
problem as property issues. But that error-if it is error-is deeply
entrenched. There is no practical likelihood that it will be
abandoned. Nor is abandonment necessary. The public forum
problem can be viewed through the prism of property and still
resolved consistently with the increasingly predominant vision of free
expression-that governments must remain neutral with respect to
public debate but need not actively promote such discourse. The
2. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983)).
3. Id.
4. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,806 (1985).
5. See, e.g., id at 802 ("The Government [creates a] public forum... only by
intentionally opening a nontraditional public forum for public discourse."); Arkansas Ed.
Television Comm. v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633,1641 (1998).
6. Int'l Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992),
described the designated public forum as public "property that the state has opened for
expressive activity by all or part of the public." Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1641 (1998), described
the designated public forum as public property opened "for expressive use by the general
public or by a particular class of speakers."
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Court must however consider a broader spectrum of free speech
issues that are refracted through that prism.
In this article I examine how the Court developed such an
inefficacious body of law and offer some normative suggestions
concerning how it might reconceive its doctrine to be more aligned
with the Court's apparently operative negative theory of free speech.
Part One surveys the development of the doctrine and assesses some
of the more glaring defects of the present Byzantine categorical
structure. In so doing I hope to illustrate how poorly certain Court
doctrines function and, perhaps, to reveal why the Court has gone so
badly astray.
Part Two is a brief examination of the ad hoc balancing approach
with which the Court briefly flirted. Though many commentators
prefer this road not taken there are good reasons for its avoidance.
Ad hoc balancing is indeterminate, costly, and not necessarily
beneficial.
Part Three of this article offers some suggestions for positive
change in the doctrine. I argue that the Court's focus on the
character of the public property is not so much wrong as incomplete.
The problem of the public forum occurs because of the agency
problems that inhere in democratic self-governance. Public property
is owned by the sovereign people but possessed and administered by
the people's agents, public officialdom. But because public property
has multiple uses, this agency problem cannot be resolved simply by
asserting the principal's paramount right to the property.
The Court's public forum doctrine responds to the varied use of
public property by examining the character of the public property to
determine whether speech is among its multiple uses. I propose that
the Court should determine the scope of the principal's presumptive
right of access to public property for speech purposes by making an
analogy to the common law doctrine of nuisance. Since the general
public owns public property, the use of such property for speech
purposes is analogous to the nuisance problem: When does a property
owner's use of his property so significantly interfere with the use and
enjoyment of another's property that a nuisance is recognized? The
balancing formula used to assess nuisance-does the gravity of the
harm inflicted by any given use outweigh the social utility of that
use?-can be adapted to the public forum problem. In short, the task
is to assess the harm inflicted by and utility of speech restrictions on
public property as well as to gauge the harm inflicted by speech on
public property in relation to the utility of citizen speech on such
property. This can only be done if the courts have a clear,
consistently applied theory of the function of free speech. If the
affirmative theory is used the result is nothing more than another
warmed-over version of ad hoc balancing, an approach that the Court
January 1999] PUBLIC FORA
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has rightly rejected. If the negative theory is used, however, much of
the indeterminacy of ad hoc balancing is eliminated. Moreover, when
the negative theory is used to set the standards by which to measure
harm and utility, the elements of the Court's existing doctrine can
readily be unbundled and repackaged in the harm/utility calculus. In
Part Three I attempt to do so and demonstrate how that
reformulation would improve the public forum doctrine and avoid
most of the indeterminacy and other costs associated with ad hoc
balancing.
I. The Evolution of Public Forum Doctrine
The public forum problem arises because most public property
has multiple uses. The public forum doctrine is, or at least ought to
be, an attempt to mediate the tension between the public's claim to
use public property for speech purposes and the government's
asserted need to muzzle some or all speech in order to use the
property for legitimate non-speech purposes.
The polar extremes can easily be dismissed. Governments might
be thought to be the absolute owners of "their" property, just like
private owners, and so entitled to oust unwanted speakers at their
pleasure. This view, once espoused by Justice Holmes,7 has long been
repudiated. Governments are sovereigns as well as mere property
owners, and even their sovereignty is held in trust for the people who
gave it to them. The other extreme is no more tenable. Governments
cannot perform many of the functions we entrust to them if all of
"their" property is open for public speech.
The Court's attempt to fashion a middle position has responded
to two diverging principles. One is the idea that the public has a
minimal right of access to public property for purposes of
communication.8 The other is the notion that if public property is
opened to speech, the government may not choke off such speech
selectively on the basis of its content.9
While each of these principles limit government regulation, their
rationales are not easily harmonized. The former principle is
intolerant of absolute bans of speech on public property because it is
rooted in the "affirmative theory" of free speech-the idea that the
free speech guarantee should actively promote public discourse.
Lillian BeVier calls this "the Enhancement model, which.., is
committed to the view that First Amendment rules can and ought to
7. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), aff'd sub nom. Davis v.
Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
8. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 417 (1939); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943).
9. See Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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be effective tools for augmenting both the quality and quantity of
public debate, and accepts the corollary proposition that the
Amendment sometimes imposes affirmative duties on government to
maximize the opportunities for expression."'10 On this view, the free
speech clause should in many, if not most, instances compel
governments to open public spaces for speech purposes."
The latter principle accepts such bans so long as they are
content-neutral (or, perhaps, as we shall see, merely viewpoint-
neutral) because it is grounded in the "negative theory" of free
speech-the idea that the free speech guarantee should primarily or
exclusively restrain governments from meddling with the content or
skewing the outcome of public discourse. BeVier calls this "the
Distortion model, [under which] ... the essential task of First
Amendment rules is to restrain government from deliberately
manipulating the content or outcome of public debate and to prohibit
it from censoring, punishing, or selectively denying speech
opportunities to disfavored views."12 On this view, the free speech
clause should operate to insure government neutrality with respect to
speech on public property.
The Court's method of avoiding undue collision is to define some
public property as a "traditional public forum," which may neither be
altogether closed to speech nor selectively closed on the basis of
speech content without proof of the extraordinary justification
required by strict scrutiny, and to categorize the remaining public
property as either not a public forum at all (leaving governments free
to impose any speech restriction rationally related to a legitimate
interest) or as a "limited public forum" (which may be closed to all
speech purposes except those for which it is opened, so long as the
criteria for opening the forum to speech is viewpoint-neutral). The
traditional public forum is a nod to the affirmative theory, and the
rest of the doctrine is a deep, but ultimately graceless, bow to the
negative theory of free speech. A brief synopsis of the development
of this taxonomy may be helpful.
A. The Originating Principles of the Public Forum
The Court's first encounter with the public forum was not a
success. Davis, a preacher of some sort, was convicted of speaking on
Boston Common without a permit. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, speaking through Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., upheld
the conviction: "For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to
10. Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories,
1992 Sup. Or. REv. 79, 101.
11. See infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
12. BeVier, supra note 10, at 102-03.
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forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an
infringement of rights of a member of the public than for the owner
of a private house to forbid it in his house."'1 3  In Davis v.
Massachusetts the United States Supreme Court affirmed: "The right
to absolutely exclude all right to use, necessarily includes the
authority to determine under what circumstances such use may be
availed of, as the greater power contains the lesser."'14 The problem
with this simple view is the assumption that governments have an
absolute right to exclude the people from public property. If this is so
at all times and in all places, the concept of the sovereign people is a
delusional conceit. In a democracy the government cannot be
entirely exogenous to the people. Nevertheless, Justice Holmes and
his soon-to-be brethren on the Court conceived of the public forum
problem as no problem at all; it was simply a matter of property law,
and an owner's right to exclusive possession settled the issue. Thus
was born the practice of viewing speech rights on public property
through a property prism. If there was any theory of free speech
involved it was a crudely negative one.
The Davis rationale survived for forty years. In Hague v. CIO,
the Court was asked to invoke Davis to uphold a Jersey City
ordinance imposing a permit requirement for speech in public
places.' 5 The Court rejected Davis's expansive rationale and, in doing
so, Justice Roberts delivered his famous dictum that, despite the fact
that title to the "streets and parks may rest [in governments] they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
citizens."'1 6  Here was an affirmative view-the government was
obliged to make some of "its" property available to promote public
discourse. As a result, said Harry Kalven, "a kind of First-
Amendment easement" for speech was created by prescription.17 But
as with easements of a more prosaic sort, what is the scope of this
prescriptive easement for speech?
The breadth of the Roberts dictum in Hague was more apparent
than real. In Cox v. Louisiana, although the Court overturned the
conviction of civil rights demonstrators for breach of the peace,
Justice Black described the scope of the easement for speech as
13. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 U.S. 113,113 (1897).
14. 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897).
15. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
16. Id. at 515.
17. Kalven, supra note 1, at 16.
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extending to all public spaces "where people have a right to be for
[speech] purposes."' 8 This begs the question, of course, but the way
in which it does so is instructive. Black's formulation makes speech
rights dependent upon the speaker's rightful presence on public
property, and this suggests that the government's rights as property
owner are the paramount determinant of such speech rights. A
slightly different phrasing, but one drawing upon the same theme, was
undertaken by Justice Frankfurter in Niemotko v. Maryland.19 To
Frankfurter, the public forum problem boiled down to a balancing of
"the interest in allowing free expression in public places" against
preservation of "the primary uses of streets and parks. '20 There can
be little argument over the primary uses of streets and parks-
transportation and recreation. On this view, speech that interferes to
any material degree with these primary uses is not constitutionally
protected. The definitive principle is the use to which the
government, as holder of title to property, has dedicated the property.
Once again, property rights, conceived for the most part to govern the
competing claims of private citizens, effectively control the scope of
the public's easement for speech on public property. The Black
formulation was endorsed by a majority of the Court in Adderley v.
Florida:21 "The State, no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which
it is lawfully dedicated."2 From this perspective, there is not much
room on public property for the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"
speech that the Court says is essential to public discourse23 and which
is at the core of the affirmative theory of free speech.
Black's and Frankfurter's resolution of the public forum problem
is only one narrow band in the spectrum of solutions revealed by the
property prism. The Roberts dictum conceived of the public's right to
speak on public property as part of a general right to disseminate
ideas, entailing a minimum right of access to public property for this
purpose. The Black and Frankfurter position is consistent with, even
if not necessarily required by, the principle that public property
opened to speech must be opened evenhandedly. But government
attempts to censor speech by opening public property to some
speakers, or some subjects, have met a mixed fate, suggesting that
evenhandedness is not sacrosanct when it comes to speech on public
property. The early cases viewed departures from neutrality
18. 379 U.S. 536, 578 (1965) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
19. 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
20. Id. at 276 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
21. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
22. Id. at 47.
23. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).
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skeptically, striking down municipal ordinances that vested unfettered
discretion in public officials to decide which speakers could distribute
leaflets on city streets24 or could use sound amplification equipment.2
5
But at almost the same moment the Court upheld a regulation
prohibiting street demonstrations without a permit, where official
discretion concerning the permit was limited "to considerations of
time, place and manner so as to conserve the public convenience.
'26
Thus was born the principle, actuated by negative free speech theory,
that content-neutral restrictions of speech in the public forum are
acceptable so long as the government has good and sufficient reason
for their imposition.
The negative theory principle of even-handedness and the
affirmative theory of general access quickly collided. In order to
prevent littering, a quartet of New Jersey cities banned all leafleting
in the public streets. The regulations were even-handed; all
leafleting, no matter what subject or viewpoint might be advanced,
was banned. The regulations did not deny all access to the public
streets for speech purposes; only speech conducted through the leaflet
medium was affected. In Schneider v. State, the Court invalidated
these regulations because there were less speech restrictive means
available to accomplish the legitimate objective of preventing
littering.27 If one viewpoint could be said to prevail, it was the
"general access" principle. Evenhandedness, in the form of content-
neutrality, was not enough. The traditional public forum is open for
speech, and even content-neutral restrictions on speech must be a last
resort to accomplishment of legitimate regulatory goals. Or so it
seemed, until Kovacs v. Cooper, in which the Court upheld a Trenton,
New Jersey ordinance banning all "loud and raucous" sound trucks
from the city's streets 2 9  A three-justice plurality sustained the
regulation on the ground that it was not a flat ban. Joining the
plurality in the result were Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, both of
whom thought it was a flat ban but concluded that outright bans were
permissible so long as they were not attempts to censor.30 The
dissenters also thought that the ordinance was a flat ban but
contended that the Court's toleration of a flat ban of an entire
medium was inconsistent with Saia and offensive to the "basic
24. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,451 (1938).
25. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558,562 (1948).
26. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,575-76 (1941).
27. 308 U.S. 147, 162-65 (1939).
28. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (city ordinance prohibiting the
distribution of literature by ringing a house doorbell or otherwise summoning the
occupants struck down).
29. 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949).
30. See id. at 97-98.
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premise of the First Amendment [-] that all. . . instruments of
communication. . . shall be free from governmental censorship or
prohibition."31
The early cases suggest, at best, a draw between affirmative and
negative theory, or may simply illustrate the Court's indecision
concerning which theory is best suited to resolution of the public
forum problem.
B. The Binary Nature of the Present Doctrine
The Court's willingness, displayed in Kovacs, to tolerate content-
neutral flat bans of particular media in the public forum eventually
was transformed into the Court's pigeon-hole approach to the public
forum problem. Speech in a public forum, whether the forum is
traditional or voluntarily created, receives the full measure of
constitutional protection. Speech on public property that is not a
public forum receives little protection.
Speech restrictions in the traditional public forum must be
"reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions" that are "content-
neutral, . . .narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. 32 The narrow tailoring requirement does not,
however, mean the regulation must be the least speech-restrictive way
of accomplishing the government's objective. According to Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, "so long as the. . . regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation," the regulation is sufficiently
narrowly tailored.33 The general access strand, exemplified by
Schneider, is preserved in an attenuated form by the requirement that
the speech regulation leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. The Court has upheld a "focused picketing"
ordinance as inoffensive to this element, reasoning that since only
picketing focused upon and taking place outside a particular
residence was barred, protesters were free to deliver their message by
mail, telephone, door-to-door canvassing, or unfocused street
demonstrations.34 But this element does have some teeth. In City of
31. Id. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting).
32. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983)).
33. 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689
(1985)). See also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,299 (1983)
(upholding a National Park Service regulation prohibiting camping in the Mall as applied
to a symbolic "tent city" dramatizing the plight of the homeless, even though the Park
Service had less speech restrictive avenues of achieving its legitimate objectives of park
maintenance).
34. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,483-84,488 (1988).
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Ladue v. Gilleo, the Court unanimously voided an ordinance banning
the posting of most signs in order to minimize visual clutter.35 The
content-neutral ordinance did not directly implicate the public forum
(since it applied to sign-posting on private property) but the Court
found the city's near-total foreclosure of signs troubling: "Although
prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of
content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to the
freedom of speech is readily apparent-by eliminating a common
means of speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech.
'36
Ultimately, the Court was "not persuaded that adequate substitutes
exist for the important medium of speech. '3
7
Most of the Court's effort has been expended on drawing lines
between public property that is a public forum and public property
that is not. The Court recognizes that some public property is a
traditional public forum-endowed with a presumptive right of public
access for speech. All other public fora become so by deliberate
dedication to speech use, and that dedication may be unlimited (for
all speech purposes) or limited (open for only a defined category of
speech). Any other public property is not a public forum of any kind.
The Court's commitment to this taxonomy of public property
was made in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, in
which the Court concluded that a public school district's interschool
mail system was not a public forum38 The school district had opened
the system to a teachers' union that was the collective bargaining
agent for the district's teachers and closed it to a rival union.39 The
mail system was not a place "which by long tradition or by
government fiat [was] devoted to assembly and debate. '40 Nor had
the school district voluntarily opened its mail system "for use by the
public as a place for expressive activity."'4' It had merely made its
mail system available to a union to enable it to facilitate its
representation obligations. The school district might have created a
limited public forum by permitting access to the mail system to a
variety of civic and charitable organizations, but even if it had done so
"the constitutional right of access would in any event extend only to
other entities of similar character."42
Perry altered public forum doctrine by recognizing the
35. 512 U.S. 43,58-59 (1994).
36. Id. at 55.
37. Id. at 56.
38. 460 U.S. 37,47-48 (1983).
39. See id. at 40-41.
40. Id. at 45.
41. Id. The school district had not "opened its mail system for indiscriminate use by
the general public." Id. at 47.
42. Id. at 48.
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government's intent to open or close public property for speech as a
determinative element for all public property other than the
traditional public fora. This represented a disengagement from the
core tension between affirmative and negative theories of free speech.
It amounted to a declaration of deference to forum administrators,
and perhaps an implicit confession of judicial failure to mediate the
theoretical conflict.
C. The Traditional Public Forum
The Court quickly used Perry to cut the tap root of the
traditional public forum, leaving it a lifeless snag incapable of further
growth. The clearest indicators of this indelicate pruning are United
States v. Kokinda43  and International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee.44 In Kokinda the Court upheld a Postal
Service regulation prohibiting the solicitation of contributions on
postal premises as applied to a political advocacy group that was
soliciting contributions on a postal sidewalk leading from the post
office to a parking lot.45 The postal sidewalk was not a public forum
at all, much less a traditional public forum, said a four-justice
plurality, because the Postal Service had not "expressly dedicated its
sidewalks to any expressive activity. '46 Part of the evidence of this
lack of dedication inhered in the Postal Service's regulations
restricting speech, the very regulations whose validity was at issue.47
This was a substantial move from Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund, where the Court had concluded that the
Combined Federal Campaign, a charitable fundraising drive
conducted annually in federal offices, was not a public forum. 48 The
Court in Cornelius declared that the government creates a public
forum "by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse. . . ."49 The decision went on to state that:
[T]he Court has looked to the policy and practice of the
government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place
not traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum.
The Court has also examined the nature of the property and its
compatibility with expressive activity to discern the government's
intent.. . . [We] will not find that a public forum has been created
in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent, nor will we infer
43. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
44. 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (decided with a companion case, Lee v. International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 505 U.S. 830 (1992)).
45. 497 U.S. at 736-37.
46. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730.
47. See id.
48. 473 U.S. 788, 804-08 (1985).
49. Id. at 802.
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that the government intended to create a public forum when the
nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity.
'50
Kokinda abandoned the qualifiers emphasized in the quoted passage.
Not all public sidewalks are created equal; some are more traditional
than others.
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee eradicated any lingering doubt that
the conception of the traditional public forum had been transmuted
into an elegant relic. By a 5-4 vote the Court ruled that airports are
not public fora, employing a withered view of tradition to reach the
result: "[G]iven the lateness with which the modem air terminal has
made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for the description of having
'immemorially. . .time out of mind' been held in the public trust
and used for purposes of expressive activity."'51 Justice Kennedy was
correct to charge the Court with an "analysis [that] rests on an
inaccurate view of history. The notion that traditional public forums
are properties that have public discourse as their principal purpose is
a most doubtful fiction. . . .[T]he principal purpose of streets and
sidewalks, like airports, is to facilitate transportation, not public
discourse. . . .[U]nder the Court's analysis, even the quintessential
public forums would appear to lack the necessary elements of what
the Court defines as a public forum. '52
The Court's method of determining what public property is a
traditional public forum employs history as a photo album. If there is
no faded snapshot of the public property as forum for speech, it has
no claim to status as a traditional public forum. It is possible, under
this approach, to imagine the creation of a public plaza and
thoroughfare in the center of a publicly owned shopping mall, in
which solicitation of money for political speech is forbidden and the
first amendment is not violated. The opinion would probably contain
the phrase, "given the lateness with which the modem shopping mall
has made its appearance. . . ." This is, of course, a blockheaded
view of history,53 one that seizes on facts, real or imagined, frozen in
the glaciers of an earlier time, as an excuse for avoiding
interpretation, context, and nuance. To his credit, Justice Kennedy
avoided this error by adopting a functional approach to the
traditional public forum: "If the objective, physical characteristics of
the property at issue and the actual public access and uses that have
50. Id. at 802-03 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
51. 505 U.S. at 680 (quoting Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515
(1988)).
52. Id. at 696-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgements).
53. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REv. 659 (1987).
Chief Justice Rehnquist seems especially maladroit with history. His brand of history is
not only ossified, but sometimes imaginary as well. See Calvin R. Massey, The
Jurisprudence of Poetic License, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1047.
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been permitted by the government indicate that expressive activity
would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the property is
a public forum. '5
4
Kokinda suggests that governments may veto the traditional
public forum by creating new places endowed with all the functional
attributes of the traditional public forum save deliberate dedication to
speech. Krishna Consciousness v. Lee echoes the theme by
reiterating that it is not enough for public property to possess all the
functional attributes of the traditional public forum. Presumably,
there must be some limit to this principle. It is hard to believe that
the Court would fail to recognize newly created roads, sidewalks, or
parks as public fora if the government expressly declared them closed
to speech, but I would not care dogmatically to disclaim that
possibility.
Whether or not Kokinda and Krishna Consciousness v. Lee
portend the demise of the traditional public forum, they surely
indicate a lessened significance and more constricted role for the
concept. Though the Court never said so-it did not' even hint as
much-the diminished importance of the traditional public forum
represents a considerable shift toward the negative theory of free
speech. After all, the principal rationale for protecting public access
to the traditional public forum is to promote and preserve the robust,
uninhibited, and wide-open public debate that is central to the
affirmative vision of free speech.
Moreover, the increased emphasis on the government's
intentions with respect to public property strongly indicates a marked
shift toward increased judicial deference to the judgment of forum
administrators concerning the advisability of speech on public
property. The reason for a taxonomy of public spaces is to settle
upon the proper level of judicial scrutiny. A practical question that
must be asked is whether there are net costs or benefits produced by
having courts rather than forum administrators decide how much
speech will occur on public property. In Kokinda and Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee the Supreme Court, by the narrowest of
margins, expressed its view that the judgment of forum administrators
is presumptively trustworthy.
D. The Limited Public Forum
The category of limited public fora has proven to be a bit
chimerical. In theory, the guiding principle seems to be that a
government may limit the speech uses of a limited public forum to
54. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgements).
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those for which it was voluntarily opened, but its limiting criteria must
be content-neutral. Thus, a state fair may open its grounds to
exhibitors who distribute printed materials from licensed booths and
close its grounds to those who wish to wander throughout them
distributing literature to whomever they encounter.55 A public school
may open its facilities to student groups for extra-curricular speech
purposes and close them to non-student groups. But the same public
school may not close its facilities to student groups seeking to express
religious views.56 Similarly, a public university may decide to use a
sequestered portion of student fees to pay the costs of student
ideological publications, thus creating a limited public forum in the
fund, but still refuse to use the fund to pay the costs of faculty
ideological publications. The same university may not, however,
refuse to pay from the fund the costs of student religious
publications.57
If this were the entire body of law, it would seem reasonably
coherent. Alas, we must also account for those cases where
governments have opened public property that is surely not a
traditional public forum to some speech and then used content-based
criteria to bar other speech. In the abstract, it would seem that these
cases involve an impermissible attempt to create a limited public
forum by content-based means. The Court has avoided this problem
either by characterizing the property as a non-public forum or by
concluding that a limited public forum can be created by content-
based but not viewpoint-based means.
Consider the classic case of Greer v. Spock.58 Fort Dix, an
important Army training post, barred all partisan political speeches
and demonstrations and banned political literature that, in the
judgment of the post commander, posed "a clear danger" to military
"loyalty, discipline, or morale. ' 59 The Court upheld these regulations,
finding that even though the public was permitted to enter Fort Dix
and speak, the post had not been thereby turned into any sort of
public forum, limited or otherwise.60 Thus, the Army was free to
impose content-based speech access rules that were rationally related
to the legitimate interest of separating military life from partisan
politics. Surely military establishments may be closed to speech. No
55. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
654-56 (1981).
56. See generally Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508
U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
57. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828-37
(1995).
58. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
59. Id. at 840.
60. See id. at 836-38.
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one thinks a nuclear missile submarine should be open to public
speech, and if the U.S. Navy wants to invite Tom Clancy aboard to
speak to the crew it ought not to be seen as creating a public forum.
But when the general public is invited onto a military base for a
variety of purposes, including speech, and some speakers are
selectively ousted it simply will not wash to declare that the military
post is not a public forum and leave it at that.
61
When the public is invited in for some speech it is not credible to
say that not even a limited public forum is created. In Perry the
Court identified the limited public forum as a place opened to some
speakers for some limited speech purposes and observed that the
"constitutional right of access [to the limited public forum] would...
extend only to other entities of similar character." 62 Of course, there
are many good reasons why speech might be selectively restrained on
a military post, but those reasons-maintaining military efficiency,
morale, esprit de corps-require a more probing analysis of their
weight in relation to the specific speech banned. The Court's binary
approach-public forum or not-is ill-suited to the task.
The other method used by the Court to deal with the limited
public forum-focusing on viewpoint-neutrality instead of content-
neutrality-is a way to defer to forum administrators except where
forum administrators have egregiously departed from neutrality.
Arkansas Educational Television Committee v. Forbes is a good
example.63 Arkansas public television invited the Democratic and
Republican candidates for election to the House from Arkansas's
Third District to participate in a televised debate. Forbes, an
independent candidate with no support, no money, no campaign
organization, and no prospects, was excluded. The Court upheld the
exclusion after concluding that no designated, or limited, public
forum had been created. "[G}overnment does not create a
designated public forum when it does no more than reserve eligibility
for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose
members must then, as individuals, 'obtain permission' to [speak]." 64
So long as permission is not granted or withheld on the basis of the
speaker's viewpoint, selective exclusion is valid. Forbes was excluded
because he was not a serious candidate, because of his views. 65 The
focus on viewpoint discrimination makes some sense because
exclusion of particular viewpoints rather than entire categories
containing a variety of views is a more pointed departure from
61. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
62. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 48 (1983).
63. 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
64. Id at 1642 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 1643-44.
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government neutrality. The Court's treatment of exclusion of
religious speakers from public property opened to other speakers
exemplifies this approach.66 But this method is unstable since there is
no easy way to tell when the exclusion is of a category comprising
multiple views or of a particular viewpoint.
E. Variations on a Familiar Theme: Sovereign or Proprietor
Woven through the cases that conclude that public property is
not a public forum, whether limited or traditional, is the notion of the
Janus-faced government: Fierce Sovereign, demanding obedience, or
Honest Tradesman, merely trying hard to stay afloat. When
governments wield the sovereign's sword to restrict speech on public
property, the property is more apt to be seen as a public forum.
When governments act like shopkeepers to muzzle troublesome
speakers the property is apt to be treated as not a public forum. A
typical statement of this view is the Court's obiter dictum observation
in Krishna Consciousness v. Lee: "Where the government is acting as
a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than acting as
lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action will not be
subjected to the heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker
may be subject." 67 Governments do have multiple roles. There are
times-when the policeman stops you for speeding-that the
government is pure sovereign. There are times-when the municipal
bus stops for you-that the government is almost pure businessman.
But the clarity of this distinction is illusory, since governments are
simultaneously sovereigns and proprietors. 68 No matter how hard it
tries to be a simple merchant the government can never completely
sheath the sword of sovereignty. By contrast, it is easy for the
government to shed the merchant's smock and act as unalloyed
sovereign. The slippery nature of this distinction suggests that there
is a real possibility that it is used more as explanation for the result
than as an analytical device for determining the proper result.
The city of Shaker Heights, Ohio barred all political advertising
on its city-owned buses, though it eagerly sought other advertising for
its buses. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights the Court upheld the
ban, after concluding that the advertising space on city buses was not
66. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
67. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992).
68. But see Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1784-1809 (1987); Michael Wells and
Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66
VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980).
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a public forum.69 "[T]he city is engaged in commerce. . .. [The
advertising space], although incidental to the provision of public
transportation, is a part of the commercial venture."70 The city was
just another vendor of advertising media, and its exclusion of political
advertisements was an unremarkable "managerial decision," 7' no
different than fare decisions or "changing schedules or the location of
bus stops. ' 72 Indeed, the city was no more than a commercial
competitor: "In much the same way that a newspaper or periodical, or
even a radio or television station, need not accept every proffer of
advertising from the general public, a city transit system has
discretion to develop and make reasonable choices concerning the
type of advertising that may be displayed [on its buses]." 73
The city's exclusion of political speech was not only reasonable,
but actually a good thing: "Users would be subjected to the blare of
political propaganda. There could be lurking doubts about
favoritism, and sticky administrative problems might arise in
parceling out limited space to eager politicians." 74 These matters are
problems only because the city is not just a private bus service, but the
government. Who cares whether political advertisements on a
Greyhound bus suggest that Greyhound favors or opposes Bill
Clinton? Greyhound management might, if either perception had an
adverse impact on revenue, but Greyhound's perceived favoritism is
of no consequence to the democratic process. Perceived favoritism
by incumbent governments is quite another matter. This may suggest
that the Court was correct, after all, to defer to the city's decision to
bar political advertisements.75 Perhaps, but the avenue to that
conclusion is surely not the line of reasoning that goes: 1) The city's
buses are just like a private business; 2) Political advertising on those
buses would impeach the government's impartiality in partisan
political contests; and 3) Ad space on the city's buses is not a public
forum. This is not very helpful either to clarity or honesty of analysis.
Another leg in the development of the theme of government as
mere business manager was United States Postal Service v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns,76 in which the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a federal law prohibiting the deposit of unstamped
"mailable matter" in letter boxes owned by private citizens.
Although the federal government did not own the mail boxes it did
69. 418 U.S. 298,302-04 (1974).
70. Id. at 303.
71. Id. at 304.
72- Id.
73. Id. at 303.
74. Id. at 304.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 142-47.
76. 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
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own the Postal Service, and the Court perceived the mail boxes to be
"under the direction and control of the Postal Service... [because the
mail boxes are] an essential part of the Postal Service's nationwide
system for the delivery and receipt of mail." 77 This is more than a
little remarkable. If the mail boxes are private property there would
not seem to be a public forum issue at all. It is only by virtue of their
inextricable connection to public postal service that the mailboxes
become de facto public property. The same connection provides the
support for the conclusion that this de facto public property is closed
to public speech "just like" a private business might close its property
to public speech. This reasoning, however, reveals the lack of utility
of the sovereign-proprietor distinction. No other vendor of postal
services-Federal Express, UPS, DBL, or a 12-year-old child eager to
distribute flyers-has like ability to curb its competition. It is because
the Postal Service is the government that it can declare private mail
boxes available only to it. True, Federal Express does not have to
deliver parcels intended for UPS though left in a Federal Express
"drop box," but Federal Express may not make it a crime to leave
them in its boxes. There may be good reason for upholding the
federal statute at issue in Greenburgh (after all, it is a content-neutral
restriction) but the claim that the Postal Service is just a commercial
vendor of document delivery services is an inadequate reason.
The government-as-proprietor motif was continued in Kokinda
and Krishna Consciousness v. Lee. In her plurality opinion in
Kokinda, Justice O'Connor relied on the fact that Congress intended
the Postal Service "to be run more like a business" than the Post
Office Department it replaced.7 8  Invoking Lehman for the
proposition that speech regulations need only be "reasonable" when
the government acts as a proprietor, O'Connor agreed with the
government's assertion that "it is reasonable to restrict access to
solicitation, because solicitation is inherently disruptive of the Postal
Service's business. '79 In Krishna Consciousness v. Lee Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that "airports are commercial establishments
funded by users fees and designed to make a regulated profit. °80 That
was enough: "The restrictions. . . need only satisfy a requirement of
reasonableness."'81
Robert Post has argued that this distinction, with some
77. Id. at 126,128-29.
78. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990) (quoting Franchise Tax Board
of California v. United States Postal Service, 467 U.S. 512 519-20, and n. 13 (1984)).
79. Id. at 732.
80. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 682
(1992).
81. Id. at 683.
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modification, is coherent. He claims that "a resource. . embedded
in social practices... constituted by such organizational roles...
lie[s] within an organization. . .. [and] is a nonpublic forum." 82 By
contrast, "a resource. . . used by individuals occupying widely
different roles and statuses, with correspondingly divergent values
and expectations. . . .lies in the public realm. . .[and] is a public
forum. ' 83 By his reckoning the advertising space at issue in Lehman
"was in all pertinent respects functionally defined by the transit
system. . .[and thus] not a public forum."8 4 There are two problems
with this conclusion. First, to analyze it on Post's own terms, the
advertising space was made available to all speakers except political
speakers. Any number of "individuals occupying widely different
roles and statuses, with correspondingly divergent values and
expectations," were offered access to Shaker Heights' bus advertising
space. Political speakers, however, were excepted. The only "social
practice" in which access to the advertising space was "embedded"
was the governmental decision that it would not be a good idea for
the buses to carry political advertising. The second problem is the
inescapable fact that even a purportedly managerial decision, when
made by government, is silently backed by sovereign power. To see
the point, imagine two bus drivers; one drives for Greyhound, the
other for a government. Each driver politely informs entering
passengers that, to insure tranquility, political talk is forbidden
aboard the bus. But the government driver has an AK-47 slung over
his shoulder. Which "managerial" decision packs more punch?
The problem with the sovereign-proprietary distinction is not so
much that it is difficult to detect which face the government is
wearing (though that is indeed difficult) but that the government is
always a sovereign. Even when governments act "just like"
proprietors they are still governments. The King may roll up his
shirtsleeves and sit down in the pub to drink ale with the common
folk, but he is still the King. The ever-present specter of unasserted
sovereign authority makes the government proprietor fundamentally
different from the neighborhood greengrocer. It cannot be otherwise,
however much we may wish it were. Abraham Lincoln is supposed to
have asked people, "How many legs would a dog have if you call a
tail a leg?" After the gullible interlocutor replied "five" Lincoln
would quickly admonish him: "Four; calling a tail a leg doesn't make
it so.''85
82. Post, supra note 68, at 1793.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1794.
85. See JOHN BARTLETr, Familiar Quotations 542b (Little, Brown & Co., 13th ed.
1955).
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II. Ad Hoc Balancing: The Road Not Taken
No discussion of the present public forum muddle is complete
without mention of the alternative approach suggested by the Court's
dicta in Grayned v. City of Rockford.86 A Rockford ordinance
forbade anybody on property "adjacent" to any school in which class
is in session from "the making of any noise. . . which disturbs or
tends to disturb the peace or good order of such school session."
Grayned was convicted of participating in a noisy demonstration on a
street adjoining a high school. The Court affirmed, concluding that
the ordinance was sufficiently well tailored to address the city's
important interest of maintaining a tranquil learning environment. In
assessing this, the Court thought that "the nature of a place, 'the
pattern of its activities"' was pivotal: "The crucial question is whether
the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal
activity of a particular place at a particular time."88
This formulation was hailed as a new dawn. "In this passage,"
claimed Geoffrey Stone, "the right to a public forum came of age. No
longer does the right to effective freedom of expression turn on the
common law property rights of the state, and no longer does it turn
on whether the particular place at issue has historically been
dedicated to the exercise of First Amendment rights." 89 At the time,
it was reasonable to expect that the public forum problem would
develop into a context-specific assessment of the incompatibility of
speech and governmental purposes. As Stone envisioned it, courts
should "seek a fair accommodation of the individual's interest in
effective exercise of [expression], the public's interest in receiving the
communication, and legitimate counterveiling [sic] interests of the
state."9 A case-by-case balancing of these interests would evolve.
The Supreme Court, however, did not cooperate. As we have seen,
the Court spurned this possibility, preferring to develop a categorical
public forum doctrine heavily dependent upon specific historical
traditions and governmental intentions concerning specific tracts of
public property.
The commentators' enthusiasm for this approach is rooted in
their preference for the affirmative theory of free speech. The
affirmative theory regards more speech as an unqualified good.
Governments are obligated to make every effort to promote more
speech. The "incompatibility" test appears to presume that all public
86. 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972).
87. Id. at 107-108.
88. Id. at 116.
89. Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SuP. Cr. REv.
233,251-52.
90. Id. at 254.
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property is open to speech unless the government can demonstrate
that the particular speech is "incompatible" with the "normal"
governmental uses of the public property. By presumptively opening
the public property to speech, public discourse was thought to be
advanced in at least two important ways. First, making public
property available "to those who are unable to afford more expensive
means of communication to reach an audience" 91 increases the
quantity of public discourse. Second, "expressive access to public
property allows government action to be challenged at its locus and
facilitates political and societal changes through peaceful and lawful
means," g thus improving the quality of public discourse.
There is, however, quite a bit to be said in favor of the
categorical approach. Perhaps the most persuasive case is made by
Lillian BeVier, who argues that the categorical approach employs
useful generalities "about the kinds of places where denials of access
tend systematically to trigger well-founded concerns about deliberate
governmental abuse and distortion[,]. . . thus conserv[ing] judicial
resources for those circumstances in which the risks of abuse and
distortion are high and. . . important systemic gains from judicial
intervention" are likely to be achieved.93 The bright-line rules of the
categorical approach make "outcomes turn on fewer relevant
variables" and force "the variables themselves [to] reflect systematic
risks of government abuse.
'94
By contrast, BeVier argues that the ad hoc balancing exemplified
by the Grayned dictum is inherently inaccurate. Case-by-case
balancing "cannot be precise unless each of the factors considered,
their relative weight, and the effects of alternative decisions can be
specified, and a definite criterion of judgment can be articulated."95
But this is not likely to occur because all too often the particular is
weighed against the general. The temptation is to weigh a speech
claimant's particular speech in a particular place against a general
governmental need to manage public spaces, or to weigh the
government's particularized need to bar specific speech from a
specific place against the general need for robust, uninhibited public
debate. BeVier doubts whether this weighing will ever be anything
other than "impressionistic," 96 a process that makes fine art but lousy
constitutional law.
91. Edward J. Neveril, Comment, "Objective" Approaches to the Public Forum
Doctrine: The First Amendment at the Mercy of Architectural Chicanery, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1185, 1189 (1996).
92. Id.
93. BeVier, supra note 10, at 121.
94. Id. at 113.
95. Id. at 116.
96. Id. at 117.
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Moreover, the balancing approach involves assessment of factors
that are inherently indeterminate. What, exactly, is incompatibility?
It might be speech that totally precludes any government use of the
property. It might be speech that significantly interferes with
government use of the property. It might be speech that merely
impedes such government use. What are the "normal" government
uses of property? Is there an idealized norm, or ought we refer to
past practices and, if so, for how long ago?
Finally, to the extent that ad hoc balancing is an exercise in
advancing the affirmative theory of free speech, BeVier argues that it
suffers from the lack of "specified-much less of specifiable-
norms" 97 against which to measure the gains in public discourse that
might be achieved by invalidation of any given closure of public
property to speech. Nor are there any reliable ways accurately to
measure the costs of such judicial decisions.
98
Whether or not the Court's embrace of categories was a
conscious reaction to the indeterminacy of balancing, any
reformulation of the public forum problem that departs significantly
from categorizing the place of speech must address this problem.
Moreover, since the categorical approach is designed to make courts
defer to the judgment of bureaucrats who manage public property, 99
an approach that departs from this system must justify the benefits of
increased judicial intervention.
HI. Speech as Nuisance
Almost nobody has anything good to say about the Court's
public forum doctrine. Robert Post claims that "[t]he doctrine has..
. become a serious obstacle not only to serious first amendment
analysis, but also to a realistic appreciation of the government's
requirements in controlling its own property. It. . .is in such a state
of disrepair as to require a fundamental reappraisal of its origins and
purposes."'1  That was said ten years ago and, if anything, the
doctrine has since become more obdurately categorical. Virtually
everyone but a majority of the Court agrees on some of the doctrinal
deficiencies. It is "strained and formalistic," mere "doctrinal
pigeonholing;"''1 characterized by a "myopic focus on formalistic
labels;"' 02 producing confusion and "diverting attention from the real
97. Id. at 118.
98. Id. at 119-21.
99. See supra text following note 54.
100. Post, supra note 68, at 1715-16.
101. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720,742043 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. Geoffrey K. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 93 (1987).
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first amendment issues;"' 03 ultimately "yield[ing] an inadequate
jurisprudence of labels."'u 4
The critics are likely to share a common vision of the free speech
guarantee-the notion that the free speech clause should operate
affirmatively to create ever more and wider opportunities for public
discourse, the fuel of true democratic governance. 10 5 Consequently,
the typical reform urged by the critics is some version of the Grayned
incompatibility test.1 6
But not everyone shares this viewpoint, and so not everyone is
critical of existing public forum doctrine. The most important
dissenters continue to be those whose views matter most-the
majority of the Court that has created the categorical public forum
doctrine. Their view derives from the belief that the free speech
clause "restrain[s] government from deliberately manipulating the
content or outcome of public debate,"'17 not that it should be a
vehicle for the active promotion by governments of public discourse.
It is entirely possible that both affirmative and negative theorists
agree that free speech is a means to an end. The roster of ends which
free speech serves includes self-governance, 0 the search for truth,1°9
103. Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219,
1234 (1984).
104. C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First
Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 109, 110 (1986).
105. This position is exemplified by the Court's stated commitment in New York Times
Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), to the principle that "debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Id. at 270.
106. Perhaps the most sophisticated of these theorists is Robert Post, who proposed
focusing not upon "the character of the government property at issue, but. . . [upon] the
nature of the government authority in question." Post, supra note 68, at 1717. Post saw
governments acting as either managers or governors and would permit governments to
curb speech "as necessary to achieve [its] instrumental objectives" of management. Id.
But when acting as a governor-wielding authority over "the arena in which... the
general public meet[s] to accommodate competing values and expectations"-the free
speech clause should tightly constrain governments from restricting speech. Id. To Post, a
public forum is any resource over which governments exercise governance authority and
"which a member of the general public wishes to use for communicative purposes." Id.
The same resource is a nonpublic forum if it is only subject to the state's "managerial"
authority. Id. See also text following supra note 81. Other critics propose simpler
reforms that boil down to a restatement of Grayned. See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, The
Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 949.
107. BeVier, supra note 10, at 103.
108. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). See also Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity,
and the Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103,116-22 (1992).
109. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market. . . . That. . . is the theory of our Constitution."); JOHN
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the development of moral virtue,"0 the cultivation of tolerance,"' the
maintenance of a safety valve to preserve social stability," 2 and a
check on government power.113 Theorists often fasten upon these
ends as values that governments must affirmatively promote. 14 But
they need not do so. It is equally plausible that these ends will be
served by a free speech clause that restrains government intervention
in speech only to insure that government remains neutral in the arena
of public debate. Public discourse that is untainted by governmental
controls or subtle influences enables the citizens to govern
themselves, find their own truths, develop the only moral virtue that
matters-individual moral virtue, learn tolerance by necessity, vent
nonsense or utter wisdom, and reveal the awful truths of the sausage
factory of government. If government simply stays out of the way of
public discourse, the people's good sense will take care of the ends of
free speech. It is a conceit of the more-government-is-better crowd to
insist that governments should be in the business of actively
promoting citizen speech.
I do not propose to enter into the debate concerning the relative
merits of affirmative and negative First Amendment theory. It isn't
much of a debate since virtually all of the academicians are acolytes
of the activist government.115 The reason for eschewing the debate,
however, is that the impact of affirmative theories on real
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 34 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ. Co. 1978) (1859)
(arguing that free speech produces truth and prevents truth from being treated as "dead
dogma"); JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 347 ("Let
[Truth] and Fals[e]hood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors[e], in a free and
open encounter."). See also Massey, supra note 108, at 122-26.
110. See MILTON, supra note 109 at 346 (explaining that moral virtue inheres in moral
choice and that requires freedom to choose). See also Massey, supra note 108, at 126-28.
111. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 10 (1986) ("[f]ree speech involves a special act of
carving out one area of social interaction for extraordinary self-restraint."). See also
Massey, supra note 108, at 129-30.
112. See THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970)
(arguing that free speech allows social grievances to be aired and conflicts resolved
"without destroying the society"). See also Massey, supra note 108, at 130.
113. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527-42 (asserting that free speech serves to "check] the abuse of
power by public officials"). See also Massey, supra note 108, at 131-32.
114. See Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation
and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1411-16 (1987), for an
assessment of prevailing First Amendment theories that conform to this pattern.
115. Among the few negative theorists are Lillian BeVier, Ronald A. Cass, and,
perhaps Frederick Schauer. See BeVier, supra note 10; Cass, supra note 103; FREDERICK
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHIC ENQUIRY, 113-30 (1982) (suggesting that the
meaning of free speech is best found in principles of negative liberty-freedom from
governmental restraint).
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constitutional law (as distinguished from academic commentary) is
virtually nil. I take it as a given that the neutral government vision
prevails, and that that vision is the driving force behind the Court's
present focus upon the character of public property as the
determinant of speech protection. I wish to carry on the public forum
debate on the Court's own terms. To do that, I will stipulate that the
primary purpose of the free speech clause is to insure government
neutrality in public discourse. I will also agree that, as applied to the
public forum problem, this principle requires some focus on the
character of the public property at issue.
The Court's focus on the character of public property centers on
two questions. What traditional use has been made of the property?
What are the government's intentions and policies with respect to use
of the property? These questions are no doubt appropriate for a
property-based inquiry, but they surely do not exhaust the questions
that might be asked as part of a property-based analysis.
When Harry Kalven examined the first stirrings of the modem
phase of public forum doctrine, he declared "that what is required is
in effect a set of Robert's Rules of Order for the new uses of the
public forum. 11 6 However, he admitted, "the designing of such rules
poses a problem of formidable practical difficulty."" 7 Thirty three
years later the Court's solution is not so much a Robert's Rules of
Order as a constitutional Congress of Vienna brokered by judicial
Metternichs. But just as the Congress of Vienna was an attempt to
bolster royal privilege against a rising flood of democratic populism,
this latter-day territorial apportionment of public spaces into "speech
free" and "free speech" zones is equally reactionary. The term
"reactionary" is a bit of a red flag-the usual connotation in academic
America is of a sour, dimwitted, bigot-but I disclaim any such
connotation. I mean only to state that the categorical approach is
reactive to the facts of the cases and the Court's perception that the
speech judgments of public official forum managers are
presumptively valid. Ronald Cass has portrayed the Court's free
speech decisions as ritualized three-act plays "devoid of hard-edged
analysis.""n 8  Act one is a statement of the facts. Act two is
"liturgical... consisting of quotations ... [that] appear almost bereft
of analytic content."" 9 Act three is "the announcement of today's
result."' 12 0  Cass politely avers that "this sketch... is as much
116. Kalven, supra note 1, at 12.
117. Id.
118. Cass, supra note 114, at 1409.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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caricature as photograph,' 121 but there is no gainsaying that most, if
not all, analysis germane to the public forum problem has been
eliminated by the categorical approach.
A. Doctrinal Diagnosis and Prescription
The problem, if not the solution, is simple: Public speech on
public property can be a nuisance. And it is to nuisance law that we
should look to complete the property metaphor for the public forum
problem. Public property is owned by the public; if we truly believe
that in democracy governments are not exogenous. Public speakers
on public property are, in one sense, speaking on their own property
and thus do not require an easement to speak. Since the public owns
public property, the use of such property for speech purposes is
analogous to the nuisance problem. Of course, our government
agents must have some power to exclude us, the principals, in order to
carry out our agency mandate. That simply restates the public forum
problem. The Court's solution is to reduce dramatically the scope of
judicial review (and correspondingly increase the power of forum
managers) by characterizing ever more public property as non-public
fora. The Court's presumption is that forum managers-the agents-
are either correct in cases of principal-agent conflict about speech on
public property or, more probably, that the cost of correcting their
errors by more intensive judicial review is greater than the
incremental benefit.
What are the costs and benefits of closer judicial scrutiny of
speech restrictions imposed by forum managers? The answer must
depend, in part, on the nature of the doctrine used to ratchet judicial
scrutiny up a notch or two. BeVier has attempted to answer this
question in terms of a comparison "between ad hoc judicial decision
making and a categorical approach.' 1 22 Advocates of the ad hoc
approach argue that "there is a high correlation between
particularized judicial decision making and substantively correct
decisions,"'2 but BeVier concludes that this supposed benefit is
imaginary. First, the values balanced are not commensurate.
124
Second, the value balancing urged by ad hoc advocates is in the
service of the affirmative vision of free speech, and there is no way to
specify a usable norm by which to measure the increment in public
discourse produced by opening more public property to speech.125
Not only is it impossible to measure how much more public discourse
121. Id.
122. BeVier, supra note 10, at 115.
123. Id. at 116.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 117-18.
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is created by each act of judicial intervention, it is impossible even to
know how much public discourse is "enough."
Moreover, BeVier has identified three types of costs imposed by
increased judicial review. First, if judicial second-guessing exceeds
some unknown threshold, the authority of forum managers will be so
eroded that they will be unable to devote public property effectively
to its non-speech uses.126 Second, forum managers may react to
increased judicial oversight by excluding even more speech, in order
to raise the stakes and thereby "decrease the likelihood of access
claims being made."' 27 Third, making the courts a friendly receptacle
for access claims "increases the risk that access claimants will engage
in self-interested strategic behavior" by overstating the benefits of
their speech and ignoring the external costs of their behavior 28 Only
if forum managers systematically and significantly undervalue speech
would this cost be minimal.
To have any hope of success, a reconceived public forum
doctrine must deliver the benefits the ad hoc approach does not and
avoid the costs identified by BeVier. The asserted benefit of the
approach that follows is that it will produce more accurate results in
terms of negative free speech theory-it will more effectively restrain
governments from skewing public discourse through denial of access
to public property for speech. Employment of negative free speech
theory avoids the indeterminacy problem identified by BeVier and
associated with affirmative free speech theory. To avoid the
incommensurable value problem it is important to frame the factors
to be compared in a single metric. The costs of increased judicial
review of the decisions of forum managers can not be completely
eliminated; the task is to formulate an alternative that minimizes
those costs to the point that net gains can reasonably be expected.
Nuisance law seeks to determine when one person's use of his
property so significantly interferes with the use and enjoyment of
another's property that a nuisance is recognized. The formula most
commonly employed to assess nuisance asks whether the gravity of
the harm inflicted by any given use outweighs the social utility of that
use.129 Adapted to the public forum problem, the task is to compare
126. See id. at 120 (citing Post, supra note 68, at 1772).
127. Id. at 120.
128. Id. BeVier likens public property to a commons "susceptible to overexploitation
or abuse by anyone who can require others to absorb the costs of her use while enjoying
most of the gain herself." Id.
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 826(1) (1979) (To determine the
unreasonableness of intentional conduct, and thus nuisance, courts should consider
whether "the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct."). There is
also a minority strand of nuisance law that eschews this balancing and focuses instead on
whether the level of interference with another's use of land is sufficiently high to cross a
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harm and social utility. There are two types of harm and two aspects
of social utility, because the problem in any case is to assess speech
and the government's restrictions on speech. A given restriction
imposes some harm and delivers some benefit. A given speech in a
particular public place at a particular time imposes some harm and
delivers some benefits.
(1) Purposeful Departures from Neutrality.
There is a threshold inquiry, however, that must be made before
turning to the problem of creating a usable norm for comparing these
harms and benefits. Since the objective of negative free speech
theory is to prevent governmental departures from neutrality in
public discourse, the first question is whether the purpose of any
given speech restriction is to alter the content or outcome of public
discourse. If so, the restriction should be presumed to be invalid and
subjected to strict scrutiny. If not, the analysis should proceed to the
next stage-the comparison of the harms and benefits produced by
the speech and the restriction.
The problem with purpose inquiry is, of course, to decide how to
identify purposes. With respect to speech restrictions on public
property there are two ways in which this might be done. Evidence of
actual purpose is perhaps the best evidence. If governments admit
that their objective is to skew public discourse, or reveal that
objective in legislative deliberations or other internal
communications, the forbidden purpose ought to be treated as
conclusively established. Absent evidence of actual purpose, a
forbidden departure from neutrality ought to be inferred if the speech
restriction is viewpoint-based, excluding speakers only because of the
particular perspective they bring to public discourse. Restrictions
that are content-based but not viewpoint-based (those that exclude
entire categories of speech regardless of the speaker's perspective)
ought not trigger the presumption of invalid purpose, but the content-
based nature of the restriction is relevant to the assessment of harms
and benefits that follows.
This distinction between viewpoint-based and content-based
restrictions echoes the Court's rhetoric and what it actually has done
with respect to the limited public forum. "Once it has opened a
limited forum,... [t]he State may not exclude speech where the
distinction is not 'reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum,' nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of its
viewpoint.' 130  Some content-based restrictions are however
nuisance liability threshold. See, e.g., Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 172 N.W. 2d 647, 653
(Wis. 1969).
130. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995),
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permissible. The exclusion of political speech from Fort Dix in Greer
v. Spock,131 or from bus advertising space in Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights,32 are apt illustrations.133 Other content-based restrictions
are not permissible. The foremost examples include Widmar v.
Vincent,134 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District,135 and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia,136 where the Court invalidated the exclusion of religious
speakers from public property open to other speakers of the same
genus. Of course, the line between content-based and viewpoint-
based restrictions is blurry at best. Religious speech can be thought
of as a discrete category or as a particular perspective on
philosophical and existential issues. Political speech may be a
discrete category or a specific perspective within public discourse.
The Court's chosen vantage point reflects its predisposition to defer
to the judgment of forum managers. The Court saw no viewpoint
discrimination in the exclusion of political speech in Greer or
Lehman, but the exclusion of religious speech in Lamb's Chapel and
Rosenberger was perceived as viewpoint discrimination.
137
Despite the Court's judgment, I would contend that the
restrictions at issue in Greer, Lehman, Widmar, Lamb's Chapel, and
Rosenberger are all content-based. In these cases, the entire category
of speech was closed. Given the indeterminacy of distinguishing
between viewpoint-based and content-based restrictions, it is
appropriate to define viewpoint-based restrictions narrowly.
Restrictions that close off entire subjects or categories of speech,
regardless of the multiple perspectives contained within the category
(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 804-06 (1985)).
See also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-94
(1993).
131. 424 U.S. 828, 839-40 (1976).
132. 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1974).
133. Of course, the Court said that Fort Dix was not a public forum of any kind, and so
the content-based exclusion was evaluated under minimal scrutiny. See Greer, 424 U.S. at
838. But this conclusion is implausible, since the military post was generally open to the
public for speech as well as other purposes. Similarly, the bus advertising space at issue in
Lehman was characterized as a non-public forum, despite the fact that the space was open
to all other advertisers. See 418 U.S. at 303.
134. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
135. 508 U.S. 384 (1983).
136. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
137. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393 ("[lIt discriminates on the basis of viewpoint to
permit school property to be used for the presentation of all views about family issues and
child rearing except those dealing with the subject from a religious standpoint."); see also
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 831 ("[V]iewpoint discrimination is the proper way to interpret the
University's objections to [the religious speaker]. . . . Religion may be a vast area of
inquiry, but it also provides.. . a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which
a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.").
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selected by the forum manager, ought to be considered content-
based. Restrictions that effectively focus on the speaker's
perspective, or that selectively close off perspectives within a category
of speech, are viewpoint based. 138 Denials of access to subversive
political speakers, or Roman Catholics, or advocates of gay marriage,
are surely viewpoint-based. Fortunately, this distinction is not
terribly critical. The harmful content-based restriction that lacks
utility will fail the harm-benefit comparison that follows. But we
need not even engage in that comparison if the government has
chosen to restrict speech access on the basis of some narrowly drawn
perspective on public discourse.
(2) Comparing Harm and Utility.
If the speech claimant cannot prove that the government's
purpose for restricting speech on public property is to alter the
outcome or content of public discourse the analytical focus should
shift to comparing the harm and the utility of the particular speech
139
with the harm and utility of the restriction upon speech. There are
four quadrants to this matrix: 1) the quantum of harm inflicted by the
restriction, 2) the utility of the restriction, 3) the quantum of harm
inflicted by the particular speech, and 4) the utility of the particular
speech. It should be obvious that these factors cannot be measured in
a commensurate fashion unless we have a common reference point
from which to assess the quantum of harm and utility delivered in
each of these four dimensions. From the negative perspective upon
free speech, the common reference point is the degree to which the
factor in question contributes to a governmental departure from
neutrality. Thus, the four quadrants can be rephrased as four
138. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
The "assertion that no viewpoint discrimination occurs because the [University
of Virginia] discriminate[s] against an entire class of viewpoints reflects an
insupportable assumption that all debate is bipolar and that anti-religious speech
is the only response to religious speech. Our understanding of the complex and
multifaceted nature of public discourse has not embraced such a contrived
description of the marketplace of ideas. If the topic of debate is, for example,
racism, then exclusion of several views on that subject is just as offensive to the
First Amendment as exclusion of only one. It is as objectionable to exclude both
a theistic and atheistic perspective on the debate as it is to exclude one, the other,
or yet another political, economic, or social viewpoint. The dissent's declaration
that debate is not skewed so long as multiple voices are silenced is simply wrong;
the debate is skewed in multiple ways.
id
139. I will use the term "particular speech" as a term of art in this section. By that term
I mean to describe the specific speech the claimant has made or wishes to make on the
public property at issue and at the time and in the manner the claimant has actually
spoken or proposes to speak.
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questions, each designed to measure this tendency to induce
government departure from neutrality.
(a) Harm Inflicted by the Speech Restriction
The harm of a speech restriction can be measured in terms of the
effect of the restriction. The more a restriction skews public
discourse, the more of a departure from neutrality it is. The
measurement problem is that we do not know, and probably cannot
know, how much public discourse is altered by the public's lack of
speech access to any given public property. The best that can be done
is to ask a second-best sort of question: Are there adequate
alternative public spaces for the speech that is restricted? If not, this
is a "high harm restriction." If so, this is a "low harm restriction."
Existing doctrine asks this question in a different way. If the
public property is a public forum and the speech restriction is
"content-neutral,... narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and leave[s] open alternative channels of
communication," it is constitutionally valid.14° But if the public
property is not a public forum this question is never asked. Some
may contend that this question is framed to accommodate the
affirmative vision of free speech, since it seems to contemplate the
promotion of more public discourse. From a negative perspective,
the existence of adequate alternatives for the particular speech is of
interest only because the government has closed to speech the site of
the particular speech. The government closure may or may not be a
sufficient departure from neutrality to merit judicial intervention.
Surely part of the analysis necessary to determine the point inheres in
some assessment of the effect of the governmental closure on public
discourse.
(b) Utility of the Speech Restriction
In terms of negative speech theory, the utility of any particular
speech restriction ought to be measured by how well the restriction
advances the neutral, non-public discourse related purposes of
government with respect to use of the public property that is the site
of the particular speech. Without the restriction, would legitimate
government functions be materially impeded in scope and time, not
just briefly or mildly inconvenienced? If so, this is a "high utility
restriction." If not, this is a "low utility restriction."
Existing doctrine asks a weaker version of this question in quite a
different context. If the public property is not a public forum, the
140. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n. v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983))(emphasis added).
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speech restriction need only be reasonable, and reasonableness
depends in part on whether the restriction rationally serves a
legitimate governmental objective. The method by which a nonpublic
forum is limited to some speakers must also be "reasonable in light of
the purpose served by the forum.' 141 If the government opens school
facilities after hours to student groups and excludes some students it
must articulate a plausible, legitimate objective to be attained by this
exclusion. On its face, such an exclusion seems unconnected to the
purpose of the forum-providing space for extracurricular student
activities. Assessment of the utility of the speech restriction is
designed to focus on the correlation between the restriction and the
effective accomplishment of legitimate government goals.
(c) Harm Inflicted by the Particular Speech
The harm inflicted by particular speech is not interference with
legitimate government uses of the public property. That issue is
properly dealt with in terms of the utility of the speech restriction.
Instead, applying negative speech theory, speech inflicts harm to the
extent that the particular speech impeaches, in appearance or fact,
government neutrality in public discourse. To phrase it as a question:
Does the particular speech cause government neutrality in public
debate to be doubted? If so, this is "high harm speech." If not, this is
"low harm speech."
By this measure, not much citizen speech is likely to constitute
"high harm speech." But this is not a null set. Consider Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights once more.142 The particular speech-Harry
Lehman's plug for his election to the Ohio legislature as an old-
fashioned fellow-was thought by the Court to present the specter of
implicit government endorsement of his candidacy. If Lehman's
placards, along with the usual plethora of commercial advertising,
fully occupied the bus advertising space, leaving no room for the
opposition's advertisements, might the public cynically assume some
governmental favoritism for Lehman? Even if there was in fact no
favoritism the appearance alone worried the Court. Permitting any
political advertising in the city-owned buses would create "lurking
doubts about favoritism, and sticky administrative problems... in
parceling out limited space to eager politicians."' 43 Here the Court
recognized the concept of "high harm speech," as I use that term.
Consider also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v.
141. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985).
142. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
143. Id. at 304.
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Pinette.144 In accord with content-neutral "time, place and manner"
rules, the Ku Klux Klan sought and was denied permission to erect an
unattended Latin cross on a traditional public forum fronting the
Ohio capitol. The government argued that its restriction was justified
in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The Court
disagreed, and analyzed the case entirely on Establishment Clause
grounds. 145 But even as an Establishment Clause case it is noteworthy
that five justices, in four separate opinions, endorsed the view that
private religious expression could be attributed to the government.
146
Justice Thomas was (hopefully) correct to conclude that "[t]he
erection of... a cross [by the Klan] is a political act, not a Christian
one."147 Either way-political or religious-the fundamental issue in
Pinette was whether citizen speech on public property would be
perceived as endorsed by government. A majority of the Court
accepted the idea that some private speech on public property can
cause government neutrality in public debate to be questioned. That
is "high harm speech."
(d) Utility of the Particular Speech
The utility of the particular speech is not measured by its
proximity to some core conception of the intended purposes of free
speech. We are not about separating "high value" speech from "low
value" speech. Instead, working from my theoretical premise that
public forum doctrine should be guided by the negative vision of free
speech, the question to be asked is: Would public discourse be
materially deprived of this voice if the restriction is upheld? If so, this
is "high utility speech." If not, this is "low utility speech."
To be sure, this factor may be the mirrored twin of the harm of
the restriction. Both factors seek to probe the question of whether
the speaker will be heard if the restriction is upheld. The difference is
subtle. Analysis of the harm of the restriction requires determining
whether there are alternative public spaces for the speech. Analysis
of the utility of the speech focuses on whether the particular speech is
144. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
145. See id. at 760
146. Justices O'Connor, Souter, Breyer concurred in the judgment, having concluded
that "on the facts of this case there is 'no realistic danger that the community would think
the [State] was endorsing religion or any particular creed."' 515 U.S. at 772 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508
U.S. 384, 395 (1993). Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented. Justice Stevens was
convinced that "the State's maintenance of the Klan's cross in front of the Statehouse
conveyed a forbidden message of endorsement." Id. at 800. Justice Ginsburg agreed,
noting the absence of any legible, sturdy, disclaimer stating "unequivocally that Ohio did
not endorse the display's message." Id. at 817.
147. Id. at 770 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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likely to be voiced anywhere if the speech restriction is upheld. The
reason for this distinction is that when examining the harm of the
restriction it is appropriate to look at the effects on public discourse
in relation to public property, since it is the closure of public property
to speech that raises any issue whatever. But when examining the
utility of speech the concern should properly shift to whether this
speech will enter public discourse at all if the forum of public
property is denied. As with its mirrored twin, this factor might be
thought to be derived from affirmative speech theory. However, it is
not an attempt to maximize public discourse; it is an attempt to decide
whether the government action will have a sufficiently non-neutral
effect on public discourse to warrant judicial intervention.
Given the close connection between speech utility and harm of
the restriction, these factors may often be Siamese twins. If a given
restriction is a "high harm restriction" it is likely that the particular
speech will be "high utility speech." Similarly, "low harm"
restrictions are apt to be paired with "low utility" speech. But not
always.
Consider the following recent controversy in San Francisco. The
National Park Service, administrator of miles of public beachfront
along San Francisco Bay and the Pacific Ocean, closed some of its
beaches to unleashed dogs. Dog owners, angry that one of the last
decent spots for a dog to run unleashed had been closed, mounted a
petition gathering and information distribution campaign on the
public beaches, hoping to reach other dog owners and influence
public opinion. The Park Service responded by imposing strict
limitations on these speech activities that effectively eviscerated the
dog owners' efforts.' 48 Under conventional analysis, the Grace
heightened scrutiny test applies (assuming that beachfront parks are
traditional public fora) and resolution of the issue turns on the
importance of the objective underlying the speech restriction, the fit
of the restriction to that objective, and the adequacy of alternative
channels of communication.149 The harm/utility calculus' 50 would
assess this problem by concluding that the speech restrictions are
highly harmful (there is no other public space where this particular
message can effectively be conveyed) and of low utility (the function
of recreation is hardly disturbed by a few leafleters and petition
148. The Park Service required advance reservation of times for such speech, limited
the speech to a single person, and foreclosed any speaker from repeating the speech
activity for a considerable period of time.
149. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,182-83 (1983).
150. This assumes that the ostensibly content-neutral and viewpoint-neutral speech
restrictions were not motivated by a desire to close the beaches to opponents of the dog
ban. In actual fact, that is a highly debatable point.
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gatherers). The particular speech is of low harm (nobody would think
speech protesting government action is attributable to the
government) and is probably of low utility (the dog owners, backed
by the San Francisco SPCA, are surely likely to be heard in public
discourse). This combination (which might be unusual) ought to
produce a conclusion that the restrictions are void. The high harm
and low utility of the restriction, when weighed against low harm, low
utility speech, ought to doom it as an impermissible departure from
government neutrality.
B. Applications of the Prescription
Is all of the foregoing just another academic theory, with no
practical value? Possibly; but I hope not, and this section is designed
to demonstrate that there is some practical value in this reconception.
To do so, I have attempted to foresee some (surely not all) of the
objections and to answer them.
(1) It's too complicated.
This analytical mode looks more complicated than it really is.
Depending on whether you treat speech utility as fungible with harm
of the restriction, there are sixteen or twelve possible patterns. But
most of these patterns are probably imaginary. By examining past
cases in terms of this proposed doctrine, only about five patterns
emerge.
(a) Easy Cases
A case could, for example, present a "high harm, low utility
restriction" coupled with "low harm, high utility speech." This is, in
fact, a relatively easy case and is exemplified by Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of Univ. of Virginia.151 The restriction at issue was the
University of Virginia's refusal to fund student religious publications
from a fund, raised by mandatory student fees, devoted to paying for
student publications. The restriction was a "high harm" one since
there were no alternative public funds available for student religious
publications. The restriction-denial of funds sequestered for
publication subsidies-was "low utility" since there was no neutral,
legitimate state objective. Indeed, most of the argument was over this
point. Virginia maintained that its objective was to comply with the
Establishment Clause; the Court disagreed. The particular speech-
Wide Awake, a student religious publication-was "low harm" since
it posed no realistic possibility that it would create the impression that
151. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
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Virginia had departed from neutrality in public debate. 52 In the
context of state-funded student publications presenting virtually
every conceivable social and political viewpoint, the addition of Wide
Awake created no risk of government non-neutrality. Indeed, the
risk of non-neutrality was most clearly posed by the refusal to fund
Wide Awake. Finally, the particular speech was "high utility" since
the likelihood of its publication was virtually nil without access to the
state-controlled fund. This combination-a high harm, low utility
restriction impeding low harm, high utility speech-demands judicial
intervention.
The other easy pattern-a low harm, high utility restriction
impeding high harm, low utility speech-is exemplified by Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund.153 The Court upheld
an executive order excluding political and advocacy groups from
participation in the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), an annual
fundraising campaign for charity conducted in federal offices during
working hours through voluntary efforts of federal employees. The
Court first concluded that the CFC was not a public forum, then
concluded that the exclusion was reasonable. The excluded "speakers
have access to alternative channels, including direct mail and in-
person solicitation outside the workplace,"'154 the participation of
political advocacy groups would be controversial and "disruptive of
the federal workplace, 1' 55 and exclusion of political advocacy groups
would "avoid the appearance of government favoritism.' ' 56
Transposed to a different idiom, this suggests that the Court saw the
exclusion as a low harm, high utility restriction impeding high harm,
low utility speech. The only thing that made the case at all hard was
the requirement, imposed by current doctrine, of characterizing the
CFC as either a public forum or not. If that issue was removed the
Court could have focused entirely on the factors that drove its
decision anyway.
It is also interesting to note that the Court remanded Cornelius
to determine whether the exclusion "was impermissibly motivated by
a desire to suppress a particular point of view." 157 The purposeful
152. As can be seen from Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 1515 U.S.
753 (1995), this issue can easily be conflated with the question of the utility of the
restriction. In the context of private religious speech on public property the utility of the
restriction-conforming to the Establishment Clause-is inextricably linked to the harm
posed by the speech-the increased possibility that the speech will create perceived
departures from governmental non-neutrality.
153. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
154. Id. at 809.
155. Id. at 810-11.
156. Id. at 813.
157. Id. at 812-13.
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departure from government neutrality with respect to public
discourse should always trigger strict scrutiny, no matter what public
forum dialect the Court is speaking.
(b) Harder Cases
Most of the interesting cases are not easy, and they present a
variety of patterns. Some will be considered here.
Perry is a particularly tough case-a low harm, low utility
restriction impeding low harm, low utility speech. Perhaps it is not
surprising that the Court deferred to the forum administrator. In
Perry, a teachers' union (though not the recognized collective
bargaining agent) was denied access to an internal mailbox system of
the school district while a rival union (which was the collective
bargaining agent) was given access to the mailboxes. 158 This was a
low harm restriction because the restriction was quite narrow. The
excluded union could have used the U.S. mail, attached leaflets to car
windows in the faculty parking lots, left stacks of leaflets at each
school for voluntary pickup, or employed public property in other
ways to communicate with teachers. The utility of the restriction was
also low because the interference with legitimate government
functions was slight. A few more pieces of junk mail in the school
district's mailboxes is not much of an impediment to school business.
The particular speech had almost no prospect of causing government
neutrality to be questioned so it was low harm speech. The speech
was low utility. Given the many other opportunities for disseminating
its message it was unlikely that the excluded union would never enter
public discourse at all. This pattern is the "small-stakes" pattern.
While the litigants care deeply, from a broader constitutional
perspective this pattern is not of much significance. Under a negative
theory approach, there is not much reason to disturb the judgment of
the forum administrators. Of course, from the affirmative theorist's
perspective public discourse would be enhanced by ordering access
and so courts ought to do so.
Kokinda and Krishna Consciousness v. Lee are variations on the
Perry pattern.159 Though the restrictions were low harm and the
speech was both low harm and low utility, the Court fractured over
the utility of the restriction. In Kokinda there was little harm in
excluding political speakers and solicitors from the postal sidewalk;
they could have relocated a few yards away on the municipal
sidewalk. While it is true that postal patrons would not then pass by
as a matter of course, the removal of speakers to a point where postal
158. 460 U.S. 37 (1938).
159. See generally United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
January 1999]
patrons must consciously go to them only diminished the level of
public discourse but did not skew either its content or outcome. The
presence of speakers was not much of an inconvenience either to
postal patrons or to postal employees although it is true that Justice
O'Connor, speaking for a plurality, declared that it was "reasonable
to restrict access... to solicitation, because solicitation is inherently
disruptive of the Postal Service's business.' 60 This may indicate her
view that the restriction was actually of high utility. There was not
much realistic risk that the particular speech-partisan political tracts
and the like-would create the impression of governmental
endorsement of the speech. Nor was there any risk that the
Democratic party-the speaker involved-would go unheard if kept
off the postal sidewalk.
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee is the most interesting one of this
trio. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey banned
solicitation of money and distribution of literature in the three
airports it operates. 16' The Court upheld the solicitation ban and
voided the distribution ban after concluding that airports were not
public fora. 62 Applying current doctrine, the solicitation ban was
deemed reasonable and the distribution ban was not. Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy were the swing voters, concurring with
different camps on each of the solicitation and distribution issues. To
O'Connor, solicitation was "incompatible with the airport's
functioning .... '[A] person asking for money disrupts passage and is
more intrusive and intimidating than an encounter with a person
giving out information."1 63 To Kennedy, the fact that the regulation
barred only solicitation coupled "with immediate payment of money"
was critical.164 Immediately successful solicitation, thought Kennedy,
"creates a risk of fraud and duress" that was enough to justify the
restriction.165 In essence, Kennedy and O'Connor saw the solicitation
ban as a low harm, high utility restriction. The crucial issue for each
Justice was the perceived high degree of interference with the
legitimate air transport function of an airport. On this point, the
remaining justices in the majority coalition agreed.166 The dissenters
from the judgment upholding the solicitation ban essentially saw the
160. 497 U.S. at 732.
161. See id. at 675.
162. See id. at 683.
163. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 at 689
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 734).
164. Id. at 704 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
165. Id. at 705.
166. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, White, and Thomas, formed a
group of four that concluded that (1) airports were not public fora, and (2) prohibition of
both solicitation and distribution was reasonable. See id. at 679,685.
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restriction as of low utility, arguing that there was minimal
interference with the legitimate functions of the airport since persons
solicited "can simply walk away or walk on."'167 In any case, the harm
and utility of the particular speech did not enter into the calculus. By
my reckoning, the particular speech was low harm, low utility speech.
The distribution ban produced a different schism. A four justice
plurality composed of Kennedy, Souter, Stevens, and Blackmun
regarded airports as public fora, applied heightened scrutiny, and
concluded that the restriction was neither narrowly tailored to
address the government's legitimate concern about pedestrian
congestion nor did it leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. 168 Transposed, this meant that the plurality thought
that the distribution ban was a high harm, low utility restriction. The
dissenting group of four-Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas-
focused almost entirely on the perceived interference with airport
functioning that distribution posed: "Leafleting presents risks of
congestion similar to those posed by solicitation.... [T]he
distribution ban, no less than the solicitation ban, is reasonable.'
1 69
Whatever their view of the harm of the restriction (probably low
harm) they were sure that it was a high utility restriction. Justice
O'Connor provided the necessary fifth vote to strike down the
distribution ban. Although she did not agree that airports were
public fora she thought that the ban was unreasonable because the
interference with legitimate airport functioning posed by literature
distribution was minimal. In short, she saw the distribution ban as a
low harm, low utility restriction but, unlike the Court in Perry, was
unwilling to defer to the judgment of forum managers. Perhaps,
without saying so, she also saw the restriction as high harm.
Krishna Consciousness is a fine illustration of the way that
present doctrine deflects judicial focus. The Court split on the
question of whether airports were public fora, an issue that is vital to
determining the standard of review. For most members of the Court
the conclusions followed inexorably. But the issues that really
divided them were not issues of proper characterization of public
167. Id. at 713 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissenters on
this point, Justices Souter, Stevens, and Blackmun, applied higher scrutiny because they
thought that airports were traditional public fora. See id. at 711. The solicitation ban
failed that scrutiny because the ban was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to accomplish
the government's legitimate objective of preventing coercion. Because this group believed
that the coercive effect of solicitation was slight (and hence the interference with
legitimate functioning of an airport was slight) the ban was viewed as not narrowly
tailored. See id. at 713.
168. See Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 693-709.
169. Lee v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 830, 831 (per curium)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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property so much as they were disagreements about the harm and
utility of the restrictions. This division would be more usefully
debated if it were cast in terms of some common metric for
determining the harm and utility of the restriction at issue. Since the
Court's public forum doctrine is largely the product of the
government neutrality, or negative, vision of free speech, it would
clarify the debate if that theoretical core were more directly related to
the doctrine.
Lehman v. Shaker Heights is another illuminating case.170
Having concluded that advertising space on city buses was not a
public forum, the Court upheld an exclusion of political advertising.
171
Since the city was just like a merchant, it would be a substantial
interference with its commercial objectives to require it to accept
political advertising.172 The restriction was of high utility. Political
advertisements would create "lurking doubts about favoritism."' 73
The speech was high harm speech. It might also be true that the
restriction was a low harm one since there was probably other public
property available for Lehman's political speech (though the Court
did not say since it had concluded that no public forum was involved),
and that the speech was low utility since it was pretty clear that Harry
Lehman would spend his political advertising dollars somewhere.
Consider Greer v. Spock again.174 The Court upheld a ban of
partisan political speech as reasonable after concluding that an army
base is not a public forum. This viewpoint-neutral ban was designed
to keep the military "free of entanglement with partisan political
campaigns of any kind," a legitimate objective "wholly consistent with
the American constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military
establishment under civilian control."'17 This passage surely indicates
a belief that the restriction was highly utile and may also suggest that
the particular speech was highly harmful. If so, Greer fits the same
pattern as Lehman-a low harm, high utility restriction impeding high
harm, low utility speech.
Finally, Arkansas Educational Television v. Forbes illustrates the
relatively rare pattern of high harm, high utility restrictions applied to
low harm, low utility speech. Fringe candidate Ralph Forbes
probably had little other meaningful access to public property for his
feckless campaign, but forcing public television to accommodate
170. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
171. See id. at 303-04.
172. See id. at 304 ("Revenue earned from long-term commercial advertising could be
jeopardized by a requirement that short-term candidacy or issue-oriented advertisements
be displayed.").
173. Id.
174. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
175. Id. at 839.
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every conceivable fringe candidate would create journalistic chaos in
candidate debates. Forbes' participation in the debate would not
create any apparent or actual governmental endorsement of his (or
his rivals) views. Apart from the debate, Forbes would still have
plenty of opportunity to speak. Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued
that the discretion exercised by public television regarding invitations
to participate in the debate was so bereft of standards that, as in past
such public forum cases, 76 the exclusion could be treated as a
purposeful departure from government neutrality.
Thus it appears that the Court is already considering these
factors, though incompletely and indirectly. The abandonment of the
pigeonhole approach in favor of the harm/utility calculus would
simplify matters. There would always be divisions over whether a
given restriction is highly utile or not, or whether the particular
speech poses a material risk of impeaching government neutrality in
public discourse, but at least these divisions would be open rather
than carried out via arguments about whether a given piece of public
property is or is not a public forum. The arguments over harm and
utility would also be couched in terms of negative speech theory, thus
providing a common metric for these arguments.
(2) It has all the problems of ad hoc balancing.
The problem with ad hoc balancing-assessing whether the
particular speech is incompatible with the normal government
purposes of the public property in question-is that it is
indeterminate. It is indeterminate because it has no common metric
for measuring incompatibility. The lack of a common metric is tied to
the fact that ad hoc balancing is used exclusively by affirmative
theorists. Since the point of affirmative free speech theory is to
obligate governments to promote an ever-expanding public discourse,
there is no referent that can be used to determine incompatibility.
Like the current thinkers in cosmology-the universe is ever-
expanding-affirmative thinkers have created a free speech
cosmology that posits constantly expanding public discourse with
government as a principal agent of expansion. Cosmologists merely
describe an ever-expanding cosmos, but affirmative speech theorists
prescribe continual expansion. If public discourse is ever-expanding
the frontier of incompatibility recedes always with the rate of
expansion. This is of absolutely no help to principled judicial
determination. With this as the alternative, it is little wonder that the
Court has stayed with categorical approach to the public forum
176. See, e.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558
(1948); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
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problem.
The harm/utility calculus is relatively free of this defect. There is
a constant referent: To what degree does the particular speech or
restriction produce a departure from government neutrality with
respect to public discourse? The universe of public discourse can
expand or contract in accordance with the taste of the citizenry. The
job of the courts is to make sure that, whatever the size of public
discourse, governments do not alter its content or outcome.
Disagreement in the application of this principle is inevitable, but the
Court is already divided in the application of its present doctrine.
The test for new doctrine ought not be whether it promises to
eliminate completely all difference of opinion. If we could devise
such doctrine we wouldn't need judges; computers would do just fine.
(3) The proposed framework offers no improvement upon the current
doctrine.
To examine this contention it is necessary first to note that the
current doctrine is an exercise in implementing a negative, or
governmental neutrality, vision of free speech. Of course, not every
justice is committed to this view, but the neutrality view is the
preferred position of a majority of the Court. With that as a given,
the problem with current doctrine is that it focuses on second-order
issues. We worry about whether public property is a public forum
because we want to identify those situations where we doubt that
forum managers can be trusted properly to assess the harm and utility
of their speech restrictions and the affected speech. Instead of
making that assessment directly we substitute the second-order
question: Is the property a public forum?
The argument for continued reliance on characterizing property
as a public forum or non-public forum is that it will avoid the costs of
increased judicial intervention in the management decisions of forum
administrators. But this argument has two defects. First, it ignores
the costs of determining the forum status of any given piece of public
property. Second, it assumes that any other mode of analyzing the
public forum problem will increase judicial vetoes of the speech
decisions of forum managers.
The costs of determining forum status are not negligible. The
most obvious cost is the dead weight litigation cost of determining
forum status. The dividing line is none too clear, as the small but
steady trickle of public forum cases in the Supreme Court indicates.
Litigation in the Supreme Court is, of course, the proverbial tip of a
litigation iceberg in the nation's state and federal trial courts. If the
line cannot be drawn clearly enough to prevent litigation over its
location, perhaps it is not such a good line. An even larger cost,
though difficult to quantify, is the cost created by the Court's attempt
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to make the forum status line clear enough to deter litigation about it.
Cases such as Kokinda177 and Krishna Consciousness v. Lee178 indicate
a willingness to define the public forum in a fashion so restrictive that
it promises to shrivel into a tiny raisin of streets, colonial-era village
greens, and explicitly created new fora. The cost of this is likely to be
seen in more restrictive forum management. Forum managers,
knowing that their judgments will be accorded great deference by
courts, will likely overestimate the cost of speech and underestimate
the cost of speech control on public property. Forum managers have
incentive to do so because such action makes their jobs easier and
keeps their expenses down. In terms of negative speech theory this is
only a problem to the extent forum managers begin to exclude speech
in a fashion that skews public discourse. But this problem is not
imaginary. If almost nothing is a public forum, and speech
restrictions need only be reasonable, there can be no certainty that
courts will review carefully a forum manager's decision to employ
high harm, low utility restrictions to exclude low harm, high utility
speech. As a result, a major cost of the continued insistence on
determining forum status is likely to be an increase in the incidence of
deviation from government neutrality in public discourse. That cost
is paid in the coin of diminished self-government.
The contention that rejection of the forum status approach will
increase judicial vetoes of forum management decisions rests on the
assumption that the only replacement is affirmative theory-driven ad
hoc balancing. As demonstrated above, that assumption is not well-
founded. A negative theory-driven assessment of harm and utility is
not likely to increase materially the number of judicial vetoes of
forum management decisions. The harm/utility calculus would,
however, make the judicial intervention that does occur more
accurate and more justified in terms of free speech theory.
(4) The Court will never adopt it
Alas, this objection is probably true. But doctrine does change
as our ambient circumstances are reconceived. All that I can do is
offer the idea and explain the reasons for its preferment. The
academician's job is then done. It is up to the men and women in the
arena to decide whether this is a better tool for the hard job of
constitutional interpretation.
Conclusion
The public forum problem has never been resolved adequately
177. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
178. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
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because the Court has attempted to straddle two incompatible
theories of free speech. The affirmative theory-the notion that
governments are obliged to promote public discourse-tugs in the
direction of ever-expanding public access to public property. The
negative theory-the idea that governments are obliged to remain
neutral in public discourse-pulls in the direction of equal access
rather than expanding access. The doctrinal edifice that bridges this
chasm relies on determining the forum status of public property-
public forum or not?-to ascertain the standard of review. This came
about because early in the development of public forum doctrine the
Court conceived of the public forum problem in terms of property.
Affirmative theorists have the whip hand when the property is a
public forum; otherwise, the negative theory of government neutrality
rules. Because the Court has severely constricted the public forum
concept, affirmative theory today is merely a vestigial element in
public forum doctrine.
The contemporary doctrine suffers from a number of defects.
Most importantly, it displaces attention to a second-order issue-
forum status-when judicial focus ought to be on identifying forum
management decisions that involve significant departures from
government neutrality in public discourse. The Court has not
reconceived its doctrine, though, because the usual alternative is an
affirmative theory-driven approach that relies on an ad hoc balancing
of the incompatibility of the particular speech at issue with the
normal government functions of the public property at issue. The ad
hoc balancing approach is infected with terminal indeterminacy
because there is no possible stable referent that can be used to
measure "incompatibility."
There is a better approach that combines the Court's preference
for the negative, or government neutrality, vision of free speech and
its preference for perceiving the public forum problem in part as a
property issue. First, government restrictions of speech on public
property should be presumed invalid (and strict scrutiny should
apply) if the government's purpose for the restriction is to depart
from neutrality with respect to public discourse. This purpose can be
found by evidence of actual purpose or, inferentially, if the restriction
is viewpoint-based. Second, if the government's purpose for the
restriction is benign, courts should examine the harm and utility of
both the speech restriction at issue and the particular speech in terms
of the extent to which the restriction or speech induces a significant
departure from government neutrality with respect to public
discourse.
This harm/utility calculus is derived from the common law
concept of nuisance. Just as a property owner may not use his
property to deprive another property owner of his use and enjoyment
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of property, so a member of the public (the sovereign owner of public
property) may not use "his" property to deprive the rest of the public
(via our sovereign agents, the bureaucrats) of the use or enjoyment of
public property for the legitimate purposes of government. It turns
out that the elements of this analysis are already in use by the Court,
but in a diffused, attenuated, and inconsistent way that is produced by
the Court's employment of forum status as a threshold device.
The harm/utility calculus would improve the theoretical clarity
and substantive accuracy of the public forum problem without
producing much, if any, of the costs that are associated with the
affirmative theory driven notion of ad hoc balancing. Maybe it
should be given a try.

